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COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS AND STRATEGIC MECHANISMS
FOR MARKET ORGANIZATION
1. Motivation
Recent advances in the theory of incentives provide numerous ways of overcom-
ing the problem of unobservabiiity of private information, by designing appropriate
mechanisms for the implementation of desired performance. The motivation for the
widespread interest in such mechanisms comes from the fact that the costs of auditing
individuals and verifying their private information are too high. What the bulk of the
literature on incentives ignores, however, are the costs of operating these mechanisms
themselves in terms of communication requirements and computational complexity. In
this paper, we present a framework within which the communication or informational
costs of incentive schemes can be analyzed. The issue of computational complexity,
being the more difficult one to tackle, is deferred to future research.
Consider the problem of resource allocation that confronts a social, planner. An
enormously complex body of information about the basic parameters of the economy
needs to be transmitted for an efficient allocation of the available resources. Economists
argue that the competitive (Walrasian) allocation mechanism (see Hurwicz (1977))
encodes the complex information into finite-dimensional signals, and determines a
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. Given that the social planner operating this
giant information processing system cannot directly observe the information dispersed
among the agents, the competitive mechanism (which ignores strategic play) can be
manipulated. This raises the following crucial questions: can the Pareto-efficiency
and the information encoding properties of the competitive mechanism be duplicated
by an "acceptable" mechanism that takes account of strategic behavior? Are there
mechanisms whose communication requirements are "close" to that of the competitive
mechanism, and which satisfy other desirable properties? This paper presents a menu
of mechanisms for the social planner. Depending on the planner's constraints, different
properties will be required from an acceptable market mechanism.
Two important questions arise at this point. First, why is the availability of such
a menu important? Second, what is a minimal requirement for "acceptability"? Each
of these questions will be addressed in turn.
An enormous body of literature has emerged since the 70's which studies the
implementability of economic performance standards by games. In particular, the con-
tributions of Hurwicz (1979a), Schmeidler (1980), Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite
(1984) among others assure us that the Walrasian standard can be implemented, given
certain inferiority assumptions, i.e. there is a game such that, for every economy, the
set of interior Walrasian allocations coincide with the set of Nash equilibrium alloca-
tions of the game. Thus, the Pareto-efhciency properties can be mimicked by a game
or "strategic market mechanism". Do we pay a price for such mechanisms in terms of
more information being required from agents when compared with the communication
requirements of the competitive mechanism? Moreover, if we insist on other desir-
able properties from the mechanisms, do the communication requirements increase?
A menu of alternative strategic market mechanisms specifies the informational costs
of implementability, together with a variety of other desirable properties. It must
be noted that even though we restrict our attention to the implementation of Wal-
rasian performance, the implications are more general: from the results in Hurwicz
(1979b), we know that implementation of Walrasian performance is a sufficient condi-
tion for (partial) implementation of almost every implementable individually rational
and Pareto-efficient performance standard.
This brings us to the question of minimal requirements for acceptability. Ob-
viously, we would require that the mechanism should implement the Walrasian per-
formance standard. If we do not impose any restrictions on the class of admissible
mechanisms, the information encoding problem becomes trivial and our search would
end immediately. This can be seen in the following manner. We suppose that the
planner asks the agents to transmit information via a signal or a message. A natural
measure of the communication requirements of a mechanism is the size of the message
space. For the case where the space is Euclidean, the size is given by its dimensionality.
This provides a measure of the amount of information that a planner must be pre-
pared to process in the worst situation. It is known that the competitive mechanism
requires a message space of finite dimensionality (see Hurwicz (1977)). Also, members
of the Hurwicz-Schmeidler class of strategic mechanisms use finite-dimensional mes-
sage spaces. Thus, by the application of the inverse of a "space-filling" device, such as
the Peano mapping, any finite-dimensional space can be smuggled into a space which
has at least the same dimensionality as the competitive mechanism's message space.
Clearly, the problem becomes interesting only if we were to impose some further
restrictions on the type of mechanism we are looking for. The appeal of the compet-
itive mechanism lies in the fact that it encodes information by relying on the ability
of agents to perform basic economic calculations. Artificial smuggling devices are
simply mathematical tricks that are beyond the reach of the average trader or social
planner. Moreover, as Marschak (1986) points out, the apparent cheapness of such
smuggled information is illusory. In practice, a continuum of messages would have to
be approximated by a finite collection of messages and a small mistake by an agent
could translate into a major error after unscrambling the signal. This has prompted
information economists (Hurwicz (1977), Mount and Reiter (1974)) to impose the re-
quirement that an acceptable mechanism must not resort to the use of such smuggling
devices. Thus, our minimal requirement for an acceptable strategic mechanism will be
that the mechanism cannot include a space-filling function as part of its specification.
This modest condition does the job of preventing smuggling of information since a
particular space-filling function must be specified a priori by the planner as part of
the description of the mechanism. Note that if the planner were to leave it to the
agents to decide on the encoding device, it would completely defeat the purpose since
the agents would then have to report a function to the planner and their messages
would not be finite-dimensional.
This restriction is naturally the weakest one that we could make. Typically, much
stronger requirements have been imposed in the literature. These involve certain regu-
larity conditions on the mechanism. Motivated by a condition of local threadedness of
the message correspondence used by Mount and Reiter (1974), a continuity assumption
on the outcome mappings of the strategic mechanisms has been suggested by Reichel-
stein and Reiter (1985). Quite apart from the fact that continuity is by itself a nice
property to have, it is much too strong a requirement for ruling out information smug-
gling per se. As we shall show, imposing such a strong, and also indirect, restriction
<;ui prevent the planner from taking advantage of savings in terms of communica-
tion requirements. In fact, by using a restriction which is weaker than continuity,
we give ourselves the freedom of checking exactly how sensitive the communication
requirements are when we add continuity to our list of desired properties.
Given this minimal requirement, we can make certain other demands on the strate-
gic mechanism, which is completely specified by a message space and an outcome
mapping. Typically, these restrictions relate to the outcome mapping. Moreover, the
extent to which a planner feels that such restrictions are necessary depends on his/her
level of confidence in the ability of the agents to exactly arrive at an equilibrium of the
game associated with the mechanism. If the agents are known to be highly-trained or
experienced professionals, then the planner may not worry about them making mis-
takes while computing their Nash-optimal strategies. In such instances the planner
need only worry about the equilibrium properties of the mechanism. In situations
where the possibility of agents making mistakes cannot entirely be ruled out, out-of-
equilibrium properties of the mechanism must be taken into account. The most crucial
properties of the outcome mapping that are desirable in such situations are: global fea-
sibility, continuity and single-valuedness. We shall briefly discuss the importance of
each one of these properties in turn.
The global feasibility condition guarantees that every outcome of the game is
such that (a) no agent goes bankrupt and is asked to give away more than his/her
endowment and (b) all net trades are balanced. The continuity condition ensures that
small mistakes by agents do not lead to large changes in the outcome, i.e. the outcomes
do not stray far from the equilibrium outcomes in the event of small perturbations of
strategies. Finally, the single-valuedness property ensures that a unique outcome is
picked for every configuration of messages. The last property is, in general, satisfied
by most mechanisms introduced in the literature. The significance of this requirement
will be discussed later.
Our research strategy will be as follows. We shall require a mechanism to
a given list of properties and ask what, is the maximal level of incremental commu-
nication requirements (relative to the competitive allocation mechanism) that such a
mechanism would need. The possibilities with different lists of properties will be ex-
plored. In addition, we shall formulate two hypotheses regarding the communication
requirements for different types of mechanisms. These are suggested by a reading of
the current state of the art on this subject and give us a benchmark by which we can
evaluate the success of our findings. The first one is called the Information vs Incen-
tives Trade-off Hypothesis (IIT), which says that a social planner interested simply in
implementation will always need to use a mechanism with a message space with strictly
greater dimensionality than that of the message space associated with the competitive
allocation mechanism. The second one is called the Doubling of Communication Re-
quirements Hypothesis (DCR), which says that a social planner interested in globally
feasible implementation will always need to use a mechanism with a message space with
at least twice the dimensionality of the message space of the competitive allocation
mechanism. The findings of this paper are extremely optimistic: both the hypotheses
are rejected. Why is such a conclusion surprising? Saijo (1986b) and Reichelstein and
Reiter (1985) have respectively argued that under certain conditions the disappointing
conclusions of the two hypotheses are indeed true. This raises the obvious question:
can their conclusions be generalized? We shall show that the conditions imposed by
these authors are too restrictive and conceal a happier result.
The arguments presented here are in a constructive vein. Some novel methods of
mechanism design arc demonstrated which provide savings in terms of communication
requirements. These include the introduction of price specialists and quasi-games, with
7unambiguous equilibrium outcomes, in the design of strategic mechanisms. (Price
specialists are a sub-group of agents who compute market-clearing prices and they are
the only ones who do so. Quasi-games are games with outcome correspondences (see
Thomson (1984)). In general, an equilibrium for a quasi-game is hard to define.) In
the process, we shall also show that the communication requirements of mechanisms
available in the literature can be further reduced.
The next section sets up the basic framework. The results of the paper are given
in the section that follows. The final section concludes.
2. Preliminaries
We consider a class of exchange economies with m goods and n agents with m > 1,
n > 1. N is the set of agents. Each i £ N is characterized by a list {C,-,r t ,U{} where
Ci = R™ is agent i's consumption set, whose typical element is denoted Z{\ r, is agent
i's preference relation defined on C, and is assumed to be binary, reflexive, complete,
transitive and strictly monotonic; u>{ 6 R-++ is agent i's initial endowment. We assume
that for the class of economies under consideration, for all t, C, and u, are fixed and
known. Let 0. = Yli£N tJ «- Let ^« denote the domain of admissible preference relations
for agent i. An economy is completely characterized by a profile of preference relations,
r = ( ri)i£N- The class of economics, correspondingly, is given by 7v = Xi^^TZi.
A = [z £ R/pn : Yli£N z * = ^1 *s ^ie se ^ of feasible allocations with A,- = {z, 6
R![* : z, < i}}. L(z,r
t )
= [z'
t
£ C, : z l r l z'i ] is agent i's r-lowcr contour set at z. Unless
otherwise specified, let y denote (y,),
€
N and let y_, denote {y} )jeN\ {•}-
Our focus will be on a mapping which associates with every economy the set of
perfectly competitive allocations in the interior of the feasible set. For any set X let
p(X) denote I lie set of all subsets of X .
1 he Walrasian performance standard, is defined by W : Jl — p(nit(A)) satisfying
the following:
Vr e^Vze W{r), 3p G A" 1 " 1 such that Vi G TV, 2, G B,(p) and £,(p) C L(z,r t ),
where
Am_1 is the m — 1-dimensional unit simplex and Bi(p) = {z, € A% ' pzi = puji} is
agent i's constrained budget set, given a price vector p.
Let W{Tl) ={zeA:3reH such that z G W(r)}. We assume that for all r G ft,
iy(r) ^ 0. (See Debreu (1959) for the underlying assumptions.)
The competitive allocation mechanism is given by a triple {M c ,/i c
,£
c
} whereM c =
{(p, z) G Am_1 x A : Vi: G iV, pz,- = pA'} is a message space, /j. c : 7v. — M is a message
correspondence where for all i G iV, /z^ : 7\L, —> M is given by /i;(r t ) = {(p,Z{) G
Am-1 x C, : z, G B{(p) and B{(p) C L(z,r,)} and £ c : Mc —> A is an outcome function
that projects every element of M on A.
Using the following conditions: (i) Y2ieN( Zi ~~ u; «) = ^, ( n ) ^ z ^ N,pz{ = pa;, and (iii)
zero degree homogeneity of demand, the dimensionality of the "competitive" message
space Mc
,
denoted dim(M c ), is equal to n(m — 1).
The competitive allocation mechanism realizes W
,
i.e.
Vr€^(V(r)) = ^(r).
The competitive allocation mechanism requires that the agents must follow the
prescribed rules of behavior and transmit information consistent with the true privately
observed preferences. However, an uninformed operator of the mechanism cannot pre-
vent the agents from manipulating it by reporting false information. To take account
of such strategic behavior, we model mechanisms as non-cooperative games. The strat-
egy space of the game is a proxy for the message space of the associated mechanism.
Next, we shall define and discuss a generalization of the usual concept of a game.
A quasi-game form or, simply, quasi-game or mechanism, F, is triple {N, S,£}
where S = x, e /vS,- is a strategy space and £ = (£ t')ieN, where £,; : S —* Rm is an
outcome mapping for agent i.
For all i G N and s_, G S-i, &(5,,s_,) = {z, G Rm : z { G &(si,s_ t ), for some
Si G 5,}.
Given that a game T is played in an economy r G 7£, a pair (s,z) G 5 x A with
z G £(s) is a strict Nash equilibrium if
ViGAU,(S„.s_ t )CL(z,r,).
Let E(T, r) C. S x A denote the set of strict Nash equilibria of F played in r and let
Es{F, r) C S and ^^(T^) C A denote, respectively, the projections of the set E(F,r)
on S and A.
Remark 1: A "quasi" -game is a generalization of the usual concept of a game
(see Thomson (1984)) where the outcome mapping may be multi-valued. A game
is a special case of a quasi-game where the outcome mapping is a function and not
a correspondence. Correspondingly, a Nash equilibrium is a special case of a strict
Nash equilibrium for games with outcome functions. Quasi-games have been studied
very infrequently in the literature. The basic difficulty with such a concept is that an
appropriate equilibrium notion is hard to define. The problem arises from the fact that
any unilateral change in strategy by an agent requires a comparison of the status quo
outcome with a list of outcomes. In the absence of any clear domination of one over
the other, a best-response calculation is difficult. The concept of strict Nash equilibria
was initially used by Otani and Sicilian (1982) and Thomson (1984) for the purpose of
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analyzing the manipulability of economic performance standards ( which arc set-valued
mappings, in general ). This concept essentially assumes that agents arc optimistic, i.e.
when they compare the utility payoffs from two lists of outcomes, they simply look at
the best (in utility terms) outcome in each list. The literature on mechanism design and
implementation, (with the exception of Thomson (1983) and Chakravorti (1985)) on
the other hand, has avoided the use of such quasi-games since the equilibrium depends
on whether agents are optimistic or pessimistic or, even, Bayesian. In this paper, we
shall use only one quasi-game which has an outcome correspondence. However, the
attractive feature of this mechanism is that the criticisms mentioned above will not
apply. This mechanism will require agents to compare a list of outcomes with a status
quo outcome only when one clearly dominates the other. Thus, the concept of strict
Nash equilibrium will yield an unambiguous prediction.
The job of an uninformed implementor of the Walrasian performance standard is
to find a strategic mechanism which exactly mimics the competitive allocation mech-
anism, i.e. for every economy, the equilibrium allocations of the mechanism are Wal-
rasian. This property can be stated formally in the following manner:
PI (Implementation): V strictly Nash implements W if Vr G 7c, Ea(F, r) = W(r).
We denote the class of all admissible strategic mechanisms by Q . A quasi-game
T belongs to Q if and only if it is completely characterized by a triple {TV, 5, £} and
does not include any space-filling functions in its description. This restricts what the
implementor can specify as part of the "rules of the game". In addition, we consider
other properties:
P2 (Singlc-valucdncss): V = {TV, 5,0 satisfies the following: Mi G N,Vs G S,£,(.s)
is a singleton.
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PS (Continuity): V = (TV, 5, £} satisfies the following: Vi 6 Ar ,<^, is continuous.
PIf (Global feasibility): F = {N,S,£} satisfies the following:
(i) Vie N,Vs(=S,£i(s) eCi and
(ii) Vz
€
iV,V5
€ ^EieivteW-^) = °-
Note that PI implies Pareto-efficiency and in the sequel we shall use P2 and P3
together, so by "continuity" we mean continuity of a function.
Given a game T = {iV, 5, £} with a Euclidean strategy space 5, let dim(S) denote
its dimensionality. The incremental communication requirements, i.e. over and above
that represented by dim(Mc ), is the informational cost of implementation denoted
/)(r,m,n) = dim(S)- dim(M c ).
Given these definitions, we can set up some benchmarks by stating two hypotheses:
The Information vs Incentives Trade-off Hypothesis (IIT): 3V £ Q satisfying PI
==> p(r,m,n) > 0.
The Doubling of Communication Requirements Hypothesis (DCR): 3T £ Q satis-
fying PI and P4 => p{T) > dim(M c ).
Remark 2: These hypotheses provide benchmarks for our study. Reichelstein and
Reiter (1985) have shown that the IIT hypothesis can be supported if we require that
T have a differentiate outcome function. Intuitively, also it seems that we must pay
a price (in terms of communication costs) for settling the manipulability issue. Thus,
IIT seems to be a very natural hypothesis to postulate. On the other hand, the litera-
ture on globally feasible implementation of arbitrary performance standards (Maskin
(1977), Saijo (1986a), Mckelvey (198G)) has demonstrated the possibility of designing
games where each agent reports the preferences of at least two agents. This immedi-
ately doubles the communication requirements, since a mechanism where every agent
12
his/her own preferences would realize any given performance standard in the
absence of strategic behavior. In the more specific context of globally feasible im-
plementation iA' Walrasian performance, the Hurwicz-Maskin-Postlewaite (1984) gain--
also uses a strategy space which is twice that of the competitive allocation mechanism.
Moreover, Saijo (1986b) argues that if we are interested in constructing globally feasi-
ble implementation mechanisms from realization mechanisms as Williams (1986) does,
then the dimensionality of the message space must be doubled in general. Given the
regularity with which this "doubling" of the message space has occurred, it is natural
to ask if such a doubling is a necessary condition.
3. Results
In this section, we consider mechanisms satisfying different combinations of the
desirable properties listed earlier, and check for the maximum value that /?(r,m,n)
must take. The first result shows that there does exist a strategic mechanism which
strictly Nash implements W and uses a message (strategy) space of dimensionality
n(m — 1). This mechanism employs two devices by which it economizes on communi-
cation requirements - an outcome correspondence and a sub-group of price specialists.
The other results give an indication of the sensitivity of /?(r,m,n) to the imposition
of additional properties.
Theorem 1: If there exists a mechanism V 6 Q satisfying PI, then p(F,m,n) < 0.
Consider the following quasi-game, denoted IV
(I) TV contains a sub-group, T who are price specialists. \ T |= 2.
(II) \fi e T,S, = {si : either s t = p t G A"
1-1
or s, = z, £ A).
V; G N\T,Sj = [sj :sj = z } € A}.
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Given s G 5, we consider three cases:
Case 1: (i) Given {*,*} = T,s t = s k = p and (ii) Vj G A^T,^ = z} with
zj G Bj(p).
CVwe 2: (i) Given {irk} = T,s,- = p,-,** = z* with z fc G Bk (p t ) and (ii) V?" G
N\T,sj = z,- with zj G #>(?,-)•
Ca.se <?; Otherwise.
(Ill) £ : 5 — UieN C« is given by the following rules:
Me i; Case 1 => Vi G T,&(«) = Bt (p) and V; G N\T,£j(s) = Zj.
Rule 2: Case 2 ==» £ fc (s) = zk and V/ G N\{k}, £i{s) = 0.
Me 3: Case 3= Vj G N^j(s) = 0.
Remark 3: The strategy space of Ti is of dimensionality n(m — 1). By the fact
that prices are elements of the unit simplex, and given that whenever an announced
consumption vector appears as an outcome of the game it must always be in the budget
set for a unique price vector, it is adequate for the purposes of playing the game if the
announced price and consumption vectors are always (m — 1) dimensional. In other
words, agents need transmit the prices or their consumption demands for only m — 1
goods.
Remark J,: Given that for every i, u
x
is in R++, observe that an equilibrium of the
game occurs only when Case 1 is true. For all other cases, the outcomes recommended
by the quasi-game are not elements of the set A. Next, we shall check that the concept
of strict Nash equilibrium yields an unambiguous prediction, in the sense that there
are no other allocations which could be equilibria. Let s G Es(F\,r) for some r G 7Z.
By definition of Case 1, given T = {i,k}, we have s t = s k — P- By Rule 1, each of
the two agents in T gets a set of consumptions as an outcome of the game. These
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c< »incide with the respective budget sets defined by the price p. We need to locate
the points on this budget set from which no agent ran hope to do better by changing
strategy. Also, we would need to make sure that such an alteration in strategy will
not yield a list of outcomes some of which make the agent better off and some which
make him/her worse off because in the latter case a pessimistic or a Bayesian agent
may not change his/her strategy. Clearly, for all agents not in T, unilateral deviation
yields a unique outcome. We shall argue that even for agents in T, unilateral deviation
yields a unique outcome which can be strictly compared with the outcomes in £(s).
Consider unilateral deviation by agent i E T. Given the rules 2 and 3, unless agent
i's alternative strategy s[ is such that s'
t
— z\ E Bi(p), agent i will get nothing. Thus,
f,-(5»,s_f) = B{(p) U {0}. Given strict monotonicity of preferences, agent i will not
change strategy if and only if z, E £i(s) is such that B{{p) C L(z,r,), which is exactly
what the definition of strict Nash equilibria predicts. No other point on B{(p) can be
supported as an equilibrium since there always exists an alternative strategy for agent
i which makes him/her better off.
The theorem can now be proved with the help of the following lemmata.
Lemma 1: Vr E 71, W(r) C EA (ru r).
Proof of Lemma 1: Choose r E 71 and let z E W(r). We need to show that
z E EA (Ti,r). Consider s = ((s k = p)keT,( s j = z]) } eN\r) where p E A
m_1 is
such that for all i E N,z { E B t (p) C L(z,r,). In other words, p is a Walrasian price
associated with (z,r). Since 5 satisfies Case 1, by Rule 1, for all fc E T,£ k (s) = lh(p)
and for all j E N\T,£j(s) = zr Next, consider unilateral deviation by some i E N to
some arbitrary s[ E 5,, s' ^ s t . There are two possibilities:
(i) Suppose i E T: There arc two further possibilities depending on whether Case
15
2 or Case 3 occurs. Thus, £ t (.s'-, s_ t ) G {0,zj} for some zj G C,-. If the outcome is zj,
then Case 2 must have occurred and it must be true that z\ G B t (p). By definition
of W and p, we have D l (p) C L{z,ri). Thus, zj G L(z,r,). By strict monotonicity of
prefernces, G £(z, r,).
(ii) Suppose i G N\T: Again there are two possibilities depending on whether
Case 2 or Case 3 occurs. Thus, £,-($;, s_,-) 6 {0,zj} for some zj G C,-. If the outcome
is zj-, then Case 1 must have occurred and it must be true that z\ £ B{(p). By the
argument given in (i) above {0,zj} C L(z,ri).
Thus, for all i € AT, £,(S,-,.s_ t ) C L(z,r t ). z G W(r) implies z G A Therefore,
zG#A(ri,r). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: Vr G 71, EaCT] , r) C W(r).
Proof of Lemma 2: Choose r £ 7Z and let (5, z) G £(ri , r). Given that z G A and
for all i £ N,u>i £ R-++, Case 2 and Case 3 could not have occurred. Thus, 5 must have
the following form: ((s* = p)keT,(sj = zj)jeN\T), where for all j G N\T,Zj G B} (p).
We shall show that for all i G N,B t (p) C L(z,ri). Choose i G N. There are two
possibilities:
(i) Suppose i G T: We shall show that Z?,(p) C ^,(5,-,5_ t ). Choose zj G B t (p).
To show that zj G f,(Si,s_,), consider the strategy sj = zj. Since zj G B{(p), Case 2
applies and, by Rule 2, £,(sj, s_,) = zj.
(ii) Suppose t G iV\T: Again, we shall establish that B,(p) C £,(S,, 5_,). Choose
zj G £,(p). To show that zj G (.(S,^.,), consider sj = zj. Since zj G £,(p), Case 1
applies. Thus, by Rule 1, ft-(s'-,s_,-) = zj.
Thus, we have
(s,z) G £(r,,r) => Vz G N^i{Si,S-i) C L(z,r,).
1G
i rom (1) and (ii), we conclude that for all i £ N,B,(p) C L(z,r t ). Given that for all
i £ N, :, 6 Bi(p), by the definition of U',r £ W(r). Q.E.D.
Remark 5: This mechanism has some additional desirable properties. The im-
plementation result works even for two-agent economies. Most available methods for
implementation need at least three agents. Besides, a weak form of feasibility is met
- individual feasibility, i.e. no agent is ever required to give away more of a good than
he/she was initially endowed with.
Proof of Theorem 1: T\ uses a strategy space with dimensionality n(m - 1) and
by Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it strictly Nash implements W. Q.E.D.
Theorem 2: // there exists a mechanism T £ Q satisfying PI, P2, PS, then
p(V,rn,n) < minv {u £ N : (n - l)u > (m - 1)}, where N = {1,2,3,...}.
Proof of Theorem 2: See Reichelstein and Reiter (1985).
Theorem 3: Suppose
\
N |> 2. // there exists a mechanism T £ Q satisfying Pi,
P2, P4, then p(F, m, n) < 3m + 2n - 9.
Consider the following mechanism, denoted IV
(I) N contains a sub-group T with | T |= 3.
(II) Vz £ T, S, = {si = (zi,qt) : z { £ A { and either q t £ A"
1-1
and z
t £ Bi(qi) or
<7.£(5,10]}.
Vt £ N\T,S, = {s, = (z
t ,q t ) : z, £ A„ qi £ (5, 10]}.
The following definitions shall simplify notation:
(Dl) Given that there exists j", k £ T such that q} , q k £ A"
1-1
and q} = q k , define
</"(.s) such that 7*(.s) = </; = q k .
(D2) 5_, : (z/t,gjL-)ik€A/\{i} satisfies Property a \ i if i £ T and the following
conditions hold:
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(i) q*(s) is well-defined and Vj € T\{i},q}; = q
m (s)
(ii) V; 6 iV\7V7j = 10 and
(in) (ft - Ei€N\{.-j *i.*-0 G ^PO Wlth (Q - Ei€AT\{0 **) G WW) and Vi e
N\{i}, Zj eB} ( q *( s )).
(D3) 5_, == (2TitWJt)fceN\{«} satisfies Property ft J t if i € iV\T and the following
conditions hold:
(i) <7*(s) is well-defined and Vj £ T, <7; = <7*(-s)
(ii) Vj" £ N\{iUT}, qj = 10 and
(iii) (a - Eiemw z" 2-' ) G ^^ with (n " ^ieN\{.} ^) e WW) and vi e
AT\{i},^G Bj(q*(s)).
(D4) K(s) = {k e N : qk e (5,10)}.
(Ill) £ : S — A is given by Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Remark 6: First, consider the case, m > 2. Given the fact that prices are elements
of the unit simplex and given the constraint ^,(z,— u>
t ) = for all qi £ Am_1 , a strategy
pair (zi,qi) for agent i £ T requires at most a price and quantity announcement for
m — 1 goods. If agent i'gT announces qi £ (5, 10], then the quantity announcement
by i must be for all m goods. Thus, the strategy space for each agent in T is contained
in max {2(m — l),(m + 1)} = 2(m — 1) dimensions for m > 2. Every member of the
set N\T has an m
-f 1-dimensional strategy space. Therefore, for m > 2, T2 has a
strategy space of dimensionality (n — 3)(m
-f- 1) + 6(m — 1) which can be re- written as
n(m— l) + 3m-f-2n — 9. Also, note that T 2 satisfies the conditions for global feasibility
and h;us a single-valued outcome mapping.
IS
Th<- case where m = 2 will be dealt, with later. First we shall establish the
fi Mowing results:
Lemma 3: Let r G 'JZ and (s,z) G £"(r2,r) be given. Vi G N,S-{ does not satisfy
either Property a \i or ft \ i =$> L(z,r,) = A{.
Proof of Lemma 3: Choose i £ N. We shall first show that if s_, does not satisfy
either Property a | t or Property ft \ i, then A{ C £{(Si,8—i). Consider z\ £ A t . To
show that z\ G £,(S,, s_,), consider s\ = (z[-, g-) G 5",- where <?,' G (5,10) is such that,
given s' = (sj,s_,), either K(s') = {»} or </(• < qj, for all j G /f(s')\{z}. Observe
that this strategy preserves the characteristic of the vector S—i that it does not satisfy
either Property a
\
i or Property ft \ i. Furthermore, since q\ ^ 10 and q\ $ Am_1 , for
no j G N\{i} is either Property a \ i or Property ft | i satisfied. Since Case 2 applies,
there axe two possibilities:
(a) Case 2A is applicable. Since Case 2AA applies, £,(sJ,5_ E ) = z\.
(b) Case 2B is applicable. Again ft(sj-,s_,) = z\.
(5,2) G E(F2 ,r) implies f,(S,-,s_,) C L(z,ri). Thus, for all i G N,A t C L(z,r t ).
By definition, for all 1 G N,L(z,n) C A,-. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4: Vr G ft, W(r) C EA(r2 ,r).
Proof of Lemma J,: Choose r G 11. The assumptions on 11 are sufficient to
guarantee that W{r) ^ 0. Choose z G W(r). To show that z G ^(r2,r), consider
•5 = ((zi,q*(s))i£T,( zj, 1^)>ga/\t) where <7*(s) is a Walrasian price associated with
(z,r). Since, 2 G ^(ft), Case 2B applies. Therefore, £(s) = z. Consider unilateral
deviation from s by some i £ N to an arbitrary s^ = (z|,gj) G 5,. Observe that s_,
satisfies either Property a
\
i or Property ft \ i. There are two possibilities:
(i) z\ — z
t . Since Case 2B applies, f,(sj, s_,) = z, G L(2,r,).
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(ii) z\ ^ z,. Since Case 1 is applicable, £,(.s'I ,.s_ t ) G {z|,u;,}. If the outcome is
z-, then it must be true that Case 1A is applicable and z\ G B t (q*(s)). By definition
of W, given that q*{s) is a Walrasian price associated with (z,r), it must be the case
that Bi(q*(s)) C L(z,r { ). Thus, z\ G L(z,r x ). If the outcome is a;,-, by the definition
of W , and given z G W(r), we have u G L(z,r,) by individual rationality of W
.
Thus, £(St-,.s_ t ) C £(z,r,) for all i G TV. Therefore, z G £?A(r2 ,r). Q.E.D.
Lemma 5: Vr G 71, £A (r2 ,r) C W(r).
Proof of Lemma 5: Choose r € R and let (s,z*) G E(T2 ,r). We examine the
possibilities arising from the fact that any one of the two cases could have occurred
and the associated outcome rules were used to obtain z*.
(i) Suppose Case 1 had occurred: We can distinguish between two possibilities:
Possibility 1: Suppose Case 1A had occurred. In this case, it must be true that
there exists i £ N such that K(s) = {i}. This implies that there does not exist
j G N\{i) such that s_y satisfies either Property a | j or Property (3 \ j. By Lemma
3, for all j G N\{i},L(z* ,rj) — A } . Given strict monotonicity of r and | A^\{t} |> 2,
there cannot exist z* G A satisfying this condition. Thus, Case 1A could not have
occurred.
Possibility 2: Suppose Case IB had occurred. In this case, £(s) = u>. We shall
show that u G W{r). Let s = (zj,qj)j£N- Observe that, by definition of Case 1, q*{s)
is well-defined. Choose j G N. There are two possibilities:
(i-a) s-j does not satisfy either Property a
\
j or Property ft \ j, in which case,
by Lemma 3, L(cj,r
; )
= Aj. Thus, trivially, 13 } (q*(s)) C L(u,r} ).
(i-b) 5_j satisfies either Property a
|
j or Property ft | j. We shall show that
Bj(q*{s)) C L(w,rj). First, we establish that Bjiq'is)) C ^(S^S-j). Choose z) G
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Bj(q*(s)). To show that z'j G f;(Sy,s_y), consider the strategy s'} = (z'} ,q } ) £ Sy,
where </' G (5, 10). Observe that, A'(.s' , .s_ ; ) = j. There are two further possibilitie
(i-b-a) (z'j, z-j) G W('JZ). Thus, Case 2B applies and £j(s'j,S-j) — z'y
(i-b-b) (z'j,z-j) G" W(7Z). Given that s-j satisfies either Property a | j or Prop-
erty /3 | j, z'j G Bj(q*(s)) and K(s'j,S-j) = j, Case 1A applies and £j(s'j,S—j) = z'j.
{s,u) G E(T2,r) implies that fj(Sy,s_j) C L(uj,rj). Therefore, Bj(q*(s)) C
L(u,r} ).
Since <?*(.s) is well-defined, we conclude from cases (i-a) and (i-b) that for all
k G N,B k (q*{s)) C L(a;,rjt). By definition of W,u G W(r).
(ii) Suppose Case 2 had occurred: There are two possibilities:
Possibility 1: There exists no i; G N such that either Property a \ i or Property
/? | z is satisfied. By Lemma 3, for all i G N, L(z*,r t ) = A,-. By strict monotonicity of
r, since | iV |> 2, there exists no z* G A such that this is possible. Thus, s cannot be
such that neither Property a
\
i nor Property /? | i is met for any t.
Possibility 2: There exists i G N such that either Property a | i or Property (3 \ i
is satisfied. Observe that q*(s) is well-defined. By the definition of Cases 1 and 2,
s = (zj,qj)j£N must be such that z G W('JZ). Thus, Case 2A could not have occurred.
Since Case 2B has occurred, £(s) = z. We shall show that z G W(r). Choose j G A'".
There are two possibilities:
(ii-a) S-j docs not satisfy cither Property a
\
j or Property (3
\ j', in which case,
by Lemma 3, L(z,r } ) = A. Thus, trivially, Bj(q*(s)) C L(z,r t ).
(ii-b) s-j satisfies either Property a
\
j or Property /? | j. We shall show that
Bj(q*(s)) Q Zj(Sj,S-j). Choose z'j G /^(^(s)) such that z'
} ^
z
;
. To show that Z> G
Zj(Sj,S-j), consider s'
}
= (z
y ,gj) G S} with gj G (5,10). Observe that A
r
(s
y
,s_y) =
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{j}. Since (z' ,Z-j) 7^ z, given that 5_ ;- satisfies either Property a \ j or Property
I
j.z'j G Bj{q*{s)) and K{s),s^) = {j}, Case 1A applies and {j^S-j) = z).
(s,z) G E(Ti,r) implies £j(Sj,s-j) C L(z,rj). Therefore, Bj(q*(s)) C L(z,rj).
Since 9* (5) is well-defined, we conclude from the cases (ii-a) and (ii-b) above that
for adl k G N,Bk(q*(s)) C L(z, rjfc). By definition of the properties a and /3, for all
keN,z€ Bk (q*(s)). By definition of W, z G W(r). Q.E.D.
Next, assuming that m = 2 with the two goods being denoted x and y, consider
the following game, denoted IV
(I)|iV|>2.
Vi' G N, let C, : R+ x A"1
" 1
-> A,- be defined by pCi(s,-,p) = pu,-.
Remark 7: Note that by the fact that m = 2, £ is a well-defined function.
(II) Vz £N,Si = {(xupi) G R+ x A™" 1 : piCi(*i,Pi) = ?»"«}
For all i G AT, given Sj = (x t , p,) and Zj = C,(x,-,p t ), consider the following cases:
Case 1: 3i,j,k G vV such that p,,Pj,pjt are distinct.
Case 2: 3 only two distinct announced prices p\p" and at least two agents an-
nounce each p' and p"
.
Case 3: (i) 3p G A" 1
" 1
such that Vi G iV, Pi = p and (ii) £\eA7 z; / fi.
Case f- (i) 3p G A" 1
- 1
such that Vz G A/",p; = p and (ii) ^-eN z, = Q.
Case 5: (i) 3p G A"1-1 and i G AT such that Vj G AT\{z},pj = p / p,- and (ii)
^-z, < a
p*; —
Case 5; (i) 3p G A" 1 " 1 and i G AT such that V; G Ar \{z},/)J == p 7^ p, and (ii)
(III) £ : 5 — ,4 is given by the following rules:
Rule 1: Case 1 => Vi G Af,f t-(s) = ^iliiU ft.
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Rule B: Case 2 or Case 3 or Case 6 =>• £(s) = u;.
Rule 3: Case 4 =J> f(s) =2.
ftife ^: Case 5 => &(*) = ^z, and V, 6 W\{*UiM = ^^>.
Remark 8: This mechanism is a modified version of the mechanism devised in
Hnrwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1984). The outcome rules are exactly the same.
The strategy space has been reduced by using the fact that m = 2. Thus, for the case
m = 2, we have the dimensionality of IVs strategy space equal to n(m — l) + n. Given
n > 2, this does not exceed n(m — 1) -f 3m + 2n — 9.
Lemma 6: Vr G 7Z,EA{T2 ,r) = W(r).
Proof of Lemma 6: See Hurwicz, Maskin and Postlewaite (1984).
Proof of Theorem 3: This follows from Lemmata 3-6 and Remarks 6 and 8. Q.E.D.
Theorem 4: Suppose \ N \> 2. If there exists a mechanism V 6 Q satisfying Pi,
P2, P3 and P4, then /)(r,m,n) < 3m + 2n - 3.
Consider the following game, denoted T4 :
(I) N contains a sub-group, T, with | T |= 3.
(II) Vi 6 T,Si= {si = (zi,pi,U)eAi x A"- 1 x R+}.
VieN\T,Si = {si = (Zi ,ti) € Ai xR+ }
Let a
« = Ej,ifcer\{«}(Pi ~ P*)
2
i
and Vz e T,
Lei
3
1 " 1 P* :i E.eT'w
Given 7/ as defined above, s, = (z^p,-,*,) for 1 G T, and .s, = (z t ,t t ) for i € N\T
define 0i(s,) to be the closest point to Zj such that #,(.s,)
€ Bi(p*).
Let T = {< 6 R++ : I x t t < l,Vz 6 TV, and * x £\ w t,z, < Q}.
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Let t* = max(e jf.
(Ill) Vi G 7V,V.s G S,£i(s) = t m tiOi(si).
Remark 9: This mechanism is a modified version of a mechanism devised by
Postlewaite and Wettstein (1983). The outcome function is a modified version of
the outcome function used in that paper. The strategy space has been reduced by
introducing price-specialists who are the only agents who announce prices. The di-
mensionality of the strategy space of this mechanism is (n — 3)(m + 1) + 6m, which
can be re-written as n(m — 1) + 2n + 3m — 3.
Lemma 7: Vr G 7l,EA (rA ,r) = W(r).
Proof of Lemma 7: This lemma follows from a slight modification of the proof of
this result by Postlewaite and Wettstein (1983).
Proof of Theorem J,: This follows from Lemma 7 and Remark 9. Q.E.D.
4. Concluding Remarks
The results of this paper can be summarized by the table in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Apart from the fact that we have established upper bounds on the degree of com-
munication requirements for implementation schemes with differing desirable proper-
ties, certain broad implications emerge from these numbers. For given (m, n), the level
of incremental communication requirements, i.e. p{Y, m, n), increases as the number of
properties desired of the mechanism T increases. Moreover, as for the two benchmarks
we had set up in terms of the IIT and DCR hypotheses, from the table it is clear
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that both can be rejected. In other words, the pessimistic findings of Reichelstem and
Rciter (19S5) and Saijo (19SGb) do not generalize. Finally, as far as further exten
sions of this study are concerned, more concrete conclusions will be given once lower
bounds or minimal dimensionality requirements are established for the different cases
considered here. As mentioned earlier, measures of computational complexity should
also be incorporated to give a complete idea of the true "costs" of achieving incentive
compatibility.
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FIGURE 1
Let s = (z k . q k ) keN 6 S.
Case V. (i) z W(R) and (ii) 3i 6 N such that s_j satisfies either Property ot|i or Property
B|i.
Case 1A Case IB
(i) K(s) = {i} and (ii) z; 6 B;(q*(s)) Otherwise
V
^i(s) = Zj, F,(s) = U)
Vj 6 N\{i}. ^j(s) = (fl - Zj)/(n - 1)
Case 2A
z 0, W(R)
Case 2AA
Case 2:
Otherwise
Case 2AB
3i 6 N such that K(s) = {i} or Otherwise
3i 6 N such that Vj 6 K(s)\{i}, q f < qj
i
£i(s) - zh
vj e N\{i}, q(S ) = (n - Zj )/{n - i]
Case 2B
2 6 W(R)
NT
Vk 6 N, f| k(s) = (jo Us) = z
FIGURE 2
Upper bound on p(T, m. n). PI P2 P3 P4
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